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Abstract
Can a computer which runs for time ω2 compute more than one
which runs for time ω? No. Not, at least, for the infinite computer we
describe. Our computer gets more powerful when the set of its steps
gets larger. We prove that they theory of second order arithmetic
cannot be decided by computers running to countable time.
Section 1. Introduction; Undecidability of Arithmetic.
Our motivation is to build a computer that will store and manipulate
surreal numbers. Hackelroad [1] and Lurie [4] examined at least two ways to
compute surreals in finite time, and shown the difficulty of building a field
of surreals in which x > y, x = y + z, and x = y × z are decidable. Likewise
for reals. In the recursive reals algebra but not order is decidable. And so it
seems that the question of whether the theory of either field under +,×, <
is decidable, ought to refer to decidability by some class of computers that
can compute more than finite-time Turing Machines. If we’re going to talk
about whether a computer can decide facts about numbers, then let’s have
a computer that can construct all the numbers we want to talk about and
decide the algebra and order relations. Computers running to time ℵ1 can
compute all reals, and to ordinal time can compute all surreals. Now, what
facts about such numbers can ordinal computers decide?
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We will prove, in sections 2 and 5, that polynomials with variables in
the integers and the reals cannot be decided by a computer running for
countable time. This is a curious result, since polynomials over the reals can
be decided by Elimination of Quantifiers, and polynomials over integers can
be decided in countable time by simply checking all the possible inputs. Our
theorem suggests that both methods are tight, or, more precisely, that there
is no way to join them together into a single countable-time algorithm for
polynomials in integers and reals. To be specific, we will show that it cannot
be decided in countable time whether there exists a real number x so that
for all possible choices of some 20 integers, a polynomial in the integers is
zero, and g < n× x < g + 1 – an inequality in the integers and the real.
In section 3 we define a general notion of an ordinal computer, and in
section 4 we prove something about them: that what can be affirmed in
time < i is equivalent to what can be defined by the sentences of order i in
a language of arbitrarily-high order. This is simply a generalization of the
idea that sentences involving existential quantification over the reals ought
to be affirmable by a computer which ran to an arbitrary countable time,
and deniable by a computer running to time ℵ1. To stress this, we will write
ℵ1 throughout to identify both the first set nonisomorphic to ℵ0, though this
is often written as the ordinal ω1.
A reader interested in ordinal computers may read only the brief section
3. A reader interested in our strange theorem may skip sections 3 and 4.
We assume CH – the cardinality of the reals is the same as the first
uncountable ordinal.
Our strange theorem concerns the language (R,Z,<,+,×). That is,
statements with variables ranging over R, with symbols <,+,× and a pred-
icate Z which is true exactly on the integers. As Alex Wilkie pointed out
to the author, this is just the theory of second order arithmetic. Let A be
an algorithm which halts in countable time on just the false statements. We
intend to show A doesn’t exist.
To each algorithm A we can build a finite-time machine B which accepts
real number inputs (an infinite, pre-written tape). On real inputs x and r,
our machine B will run for time ω just in case x encodes a run of A, starting
with input r and halting after countable time. If x does not code a run of
A on r, then B will halt in finite time. If A halts in countable time, there
is some x on which B runs for time ω. So A halts in countable time just in
case B doesn’t halt in finite time.
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We prove in the last section that there exists a statement in the language
(R,Z,+,×, <) which is true of x, r, just in case B runs for time ω on inputs
x, r. The variables x, r are just the free variables of this statement. The
statement also contains some quantified integer variables, but no quantified
real variables. Now A halts on r just in case for some real x, B doesn’t halt
on x, r. That is, there is some x so that our statement (call it φ) is true. So
A halts on statement r just in case there exists a real x so that φ is true of
x, r.
We will prove that there is a halting problem for computers running to
countable times. In section 3 we show that there is no computer which
halts in countable time just in case its input corresponds to a computer that
does not halt in countable time. But if we can determine in countable time
whether any statement of our language is true or not, then by the equivalence
shown in the last paragraph, we could determine which computers halt in
countable time.
This demonstrates a class of simple formulas of second-order arithmetic
not decidable in countable time. This has corrolaries that can be stated
without reference to ordinal computers. For instance, we prove that the
theory of second-order arithmetic is not model complete (assuming CH). If it
is model complete, then any formula is equivalent to an existential formula.
Any existential formula of second-order arithmetic can be put in the form
“for some integer values, p” where p is a formula of (R,<,+,×). We can
decide this statement in countable time by checking whether p is true at any
particular integer values, using elimination of quantifiers for (R,<,+,×).
Unfortunately, we never expected (R,Z,<,+,×) to be model complete. The
formula ∀k∃p, q|x − p/q| < 1/kq2 defines the reals whose continued fraction
terms are unbounded. It seems unlikely that the complement of this set is
existentially definable.
Section 2. Reducing a countable – time machine to a finite – time machine.
Let a program A have finitely many instructions and keep ordinal vari-
ables. Each instruction may increment a variable, switch control as two
variables are equal or not, or stop the program. That is: “x++,” “if x = y
goto l,” or “stop.” At a limit time-ordinal, control returns to the 0th com-
mand. At a limit time-ordinal, the value of each variable becomes the limit
of the values that it has achieved.
We will construct a program B which accepts a real variable x iff it codes
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the run of A. As a bit string, x is a sequences of 1’s, the number of 1’s
indicating a number, with 0’s separating numbers. B separates x into three
or more sequences. The first, z, encodes a map from ω to the timesteps of
A. The second, which we will call c for control, is a sequence of numbers
corresponding to lines of the program A: ci is the command that was active
at time i. For each variable x that A uses, xi is the value of the variable x at
time i. How can z, a list of finite numbers, code a map from ω to an infinite
countable ordinal? It is actually a list of a statements written in a language
that B can interpret so that B accepts only those z which code a map from
ω to a countable ordinal. The statements of z are: “n < m”, “m is a limit
ordinal,” “m = n+ 1,” which occurs for each n unless n is the final element,
in which case z contains the fact: “n is the final element”. In all of these
statements n and m are finite numbers; z codes a re-ordering of the finite
numbers so that they have the same order structure as the timesteps of A.
The statement “m is the final element” must appear first. In this way, B can
check whether or not there is a final element. Because z contains explicit
successor and limit statements, B can affirm, in a finite amount of time, that
n is a limit or that n succeeds m. We require that all statements involving
numbers less than k occur before time 2k2. There are at most 2 statements
about any particular m and n, so there is some z listing all statements about
numbers less than k before time 2k2.
When B learns that m is the final element, it checks that cm is the stop
command. When B learns n < m, it checks that cn is not the stop command.
When B learns m < n it checks that it hasn’t already learned n < m. This
insures z is a partial ordering. B checks that m < n or n < m occurs before
2(n+m)2. This assures that z is a total order. When B learns thatm = n+1
it checks that there is no l between n and m. This implies that z is discrete.
When B learns that m = n + 1 it checks that n is less than m. That is, the
indices of m and n are in the same order as the values they encode. This all
implies that z represents a discrete, wellordered total order. When B learns
that m = n+ 1, it checks that cm is the correct instruction to follow cn and
that xm is derived from xn by applying rule cn. When it learns that m is a
limit ordinal, it checks that cm is 0, and that xm is the limit of xn for n < m.
But how can B check that the variables limit properly?
In order to check that all variables limit to their appropriate values, B
accepts two reals, x and x′, for each variable x used in A. x is, like all of our
variables, a sequence of numbers, represented by a string of 1’s, separated
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by zeroes. The ith number of x, xi, represents the value of the variable x at
the countable-ordinal time zi. But this value may be infinite! So xi really
is the z encoding of the value of x at the z encoding of time i. B wants to
check that if time i limits to time j, then xi limits to xj . This seems very
difficult, because in finite time B has no way of knowing that any particular
sequence of ordinal numbers limits to another ordinal. Indeed, B cannot even
determine what any of the infinite numbers encoded by z are, in finite time.
So to check that x is continuous, B checks that x is monotone, and that x
and x′ are inverses. Monotonicity means that if m < n then xm ≤ xn. That
x has x′ as inverse means: if xm = n, then x
′
n ≤ m; if x
′
m = n, then xn = xm.
The sequence x is not strictly increasing, and it will happen that xm is the
same value for many consecutive timesteps; this introduces the asymmetry
between x and x′.
B checks that ci, the string encoding which command is active, timesteps
appropriately, by checking that if ci is active, then the next string to be active
is ci+1, or, if ci is a switch on a variable value, B finds this variable value
and checks whether ci+1 or the alternate command was active next. At any
limit ordinal, be checks that the zero-th command was active. B checks that
xi behave correctly, as well, by checking that xi+1 is xi unless the command
active at time i is the command ”increment x”, in which case, xi+1 = xi +1.
Section 3. Ordinal computers defined.
An ordinal computer runs for ordinal time, accepts ordinal inputs, and
keeps ordinal variables. It has finitely many instructions of the form “incre-
ment x” or “if x = y goto instruction l” or “stop” Minsky [3] proves that
these are sufficient to compute all Turing Machines running to finite time.
Actually, he proves that “increment x”, “if x = 0 goto l,” and “decrement x”
are sufficient. But we can model “decrement x” with our more general goto
switch in a subroutine that starts with variables a and b equal to 0. Variable
a is incremented. Then a and b are incremented until a = y. Variable b is
returned; b is the decrement of a. Our decrement subroutine, on an input
without a predecessor, is the identity. But I don’t think we can model the
generalized goto switch using decrement, increment, and “if x = 0 goto l”.
We can model the command x := y by incrementing x until it equals y.]
At a limit ordinal, what happens to the internal state of the machine?
Command returns to instruction 0. Variables are set equal to their limit, if
they have one; otherwise they are set to zero.
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The halting problem is as difficult for computers halting at infinite ordinal
as it is for computers halting at finite ordinals. Consider the set of computers
which halt when given themselves as input. Let A be a computer halting on
exactly those computers which don’t halt on themselves. Then run A on
input A. It halts iff it doesn’t. This is true if we take halting to mean
halting in finite time, ordinal time, halting before 10 timesteps have gone
by, or before an uncountable number of timesteps have passed. In the final
section, we will show that a computer A halts in countable time just in case
some statement of (R,Z,+,×, <) is true. This implies that that language
is undecidable in countable time because to decide it would be to solve the
countable-time halting problem in countable time.
Section 4: The computational power of a run depends on the set of its
timesteps.
We will prove that all ordinals which are equivalent under re-ordering
have the same computatinal power. Let ℵn be the first ordinal larger as a
set than ℵi for i < n. We want to know if algorithm A halts before time ℵi
on input a < ℵi. There is a computer B which halts before time ℵj , for some
j < i, on input a and all inputs b < ℵi, just in case A runs to time ℵi. This
will all be simpler if we set i=1. Then: A stops in countable time just in case
B, on all real inputs b, does NOT halt in finite time.
B checks that b codes a complete run of A. That is, b is a bit string which
encodes: 1. a map from some ℵj, for j < i, to the steps of A. Program B
sees the steps of A streaming by, in an order rearranged to be as short as
possible. 2. Which instruction of A was in command at each time. 3. The
value of all the variables of A at all times. 4. An inverse for each variable,
which encodes when the variable was <, =, or > than each possible value.
The hard part to check is that the value of the variable at a limit time limi
is the limit of the values at times i. We have already described how such a B
can operate, in the last paragraph of the previous section: by checking that
the variable b encodes strings x and x′ for each variable, which represent
inverses, and so that x is monotone and invertible, hence continuous. We
described the computer in the previous section in great detail, and here it is
all the same, but with “less than ℵi” replacing “countable” and “less than
some ℵj for j < i” replacing “finite.”
Our description of B in terms of A is entirely primitive recursive and
not dependent on A, so A may be considered a variable. Indeed, there is a
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primitive recursive algorithm to produce An from An+1 so that An+1 halts on
input a before time ℵn+1 iff for some b, An doesn’t halt before time ℵn. This
allows us to describe the set of inputs on which a program halts in terms of a
arbitrarily-high-order language. We start at the level of predicates on finite
numbers.
P (x0) is true.
A0 stops before ℵ0 iff ∃x0 < ℵ0P (x0)
A1 stops before ℵ1 iff ∃x1 < ℵ1∀x0 < ℵ0P (x0)
A2 stops before ℵ2 iff ∃x2 < ℵ2∀x1 < ℵ1∃x0 < ℵ0, P (x0)
Aω halts before ℵω iff some sentence of the form
∀x7∃x6∀x5∃x4 . . . A0 is true
We have reduced the set of inputs on which some computer halts to the
set of x0 for which some high-level statement is true, so that runs halting
before some cardinal time decide sets which are of the same level in the
hierarchy.
We remark that in the hierarchy above, sentences need not be so long.
We can exchange the existential and universal quantifiers if we are willing
to quantify over longer ordinals. For instance: ∀x < X∃y < Y A0(x, y) is
equivalent to ∃f < Y X∀x < XA0(x, f(x)). So, Aω halts before ℵω iff some
sentence of the form ∃x < ℵω∀y < ℵω, A0(x, y) is true.
Section 5. Turning a finite - time machine which accepts real inputs into a
polynomial.
Let us remember that in section 1 we wanted to build a computer B out
of a computer A so that: computer A stops at countable time on countably-
long bit-string r just in case there exists a countably-long bit-string x s.t.
computer B doesn’t stop in finite time on input x, r. The string x codes a
map from omega to the timesteps A took; for each timestep of A, the value of
each variable, and which instruction was operating. B keeps finite variables,
and is allowed to increment and compare them. B is also allowed to switch
on the ith bit of its real input. B was built in section 2. Now we want to code
B with a polynomial relation of the form p(Z) = 0 & q(R,Z) > 0, following
Jones and Matijasevich [2], so that B halts iff its statement in the language
of inequalities of polynomials is true for no integers m. That is: A halts in
countable time on r iff ∃x B doesn’t stop in finite time on r, x iff ∃x∀mφ.
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That is, a computer running for countable time and keeping countable
variables will halt on those reals r so that ∃x∀mφ. That will be proven once
we turn B into a polynomial. We turn to this now.
B is allowed the commands “n++” and “if n=m goto” for its finite vari-
ables n,m. It is also allowed to switch on the i-th bit of the real variable x:
“if xi = 0 goto”, where i is a finite variable stored by B. We want, however,
to weaken our program so it may only switch on the i-th bit of x at time ni
for some integer n. This can be done by encoding B in an interface program.
The interface is only allowed to switch on the time-indexed bit, but it success-
fully stores all the bits of x, and then B can switch on a stored bit. In more
detai: We store x, as a binary integer, until the program to store a bit takes
longer than n steps. Then we execute B on the resulting integer, replacing
“if xi = 0 goto” with the command to compute 2
i and bitwise multiply this
by x, and put the result in variable y. Then “if y = 0 goto”. We watch that
B stops normally. If B halts on x, then for some large enough n B will halt
normally on the truncation of x. If B doesn’t halt on x, then for no n will B
halt normally. So: There exists x so that our more powerful computer stops
on x, r just in case there exists x, n so that our weaker computer stops on
x, r, n. Now change B to read off the alternate bits of a single variable as x
and n. So we have simplified B as desired.
To this more restricted program B we associate a polynomial relation;
a statement in the language (R,Z,<,×,+). B halts in finite time on real
number inputs x, r just in case there are some finite numbers a, b, c, d . . . so
that p(B, r, x, a, b, c, d...) = 0 & q(x, g) > 0. This is the form whose instances
we will prove form an undecidable class of statements. The first thing to
do is to multiply x and r by 2a so as to get numbers with positive integer
parts (let’s assume x and r have no positive part). We will find g = [2ar] and
h = [2ax] and henceforth only deal with g and h: ∃g s.t. g < 2ar < g+1 & ∃h
s.t. h < 2ax < h + 1 where our integer exponentiation is, by Matijasevich’s
famous proof, expressible as a polynomial relation.
The rest of the polynomial can be interpreted as checking that a, b, c, d . . .
record a run of B which stops on “inputs” g and h. If B stopped on inputs
x and r, then B will also stop on some truncation of x and r. The integers
b, c, d . . . are bit strings. Substrings of length n represent the state of B. So
the first thing to do is stretch g and h out so that their bits are separted by
n − 1 0’s. ∃i s.t. i is the stretching of g by a factor of n. ∃j s.t. j is the
stretching of h by a factor of n.
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Let us immediately prove that these can be coded by polynomials: We
only need prove that stretching of finite bit strings can be computed by
a Turing Maching; then it can be defined by polynomials. We take from
Minsky’s paper the result that there is a Turing Maching which turns a bit
string bbbbb into b0b0b0b0b0. How? Erase the leftmost one, and write it at
the same location on a second tape. In this case, that means to turn 1bbbb
into bbbb, and write 10000. The number on the second tape is 2n. Minsky’s
maching W (2, 3) turns this into 3n, which W (3, 4) turns into 22n. Then we
write this on a third tape, and start over. When we are done, bbbbb has
become b0b0b0b0b0.
From here on we will follow Matijasevich and Jones. We need only add
a statement to take care of the commands “1: if xi = 0, goto l”. That is,
command l is active only if command 1 was previously active and x is zero.
But now since x is finite and properly spaced, our command takes the form
of Matijasevich and Jones: “Command l is bitwise dominated by Command
1 minus x”
So B halts iff ∃a . . .∃j, a through j all integers, s.t. p(B, a, b, c, . . . j, n) =
0 & g < 2ax < g + 1 & h < 2ar < h + 1. Let φ be “p(B, a, b, c, . . . j, n) =
0 & g < 2nx < g + 1 & h < 2nr < h+ 1.” So A halts in countable time iff ∃
real x s.t. ∀ integers a . . . j¬φ.
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